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Practicing lawyers tend to get short shrift from the law reviews, es-
pecially when it comes to lapidary statements. Although not an every-
day occurrence, it is not unusual for a law review to publish memorial
tributes to a deceased law professor held in high esteem. And so too
with an admired judge for whom the bell has tolled. But it is rare for
a practitioner to be celebrated in this way. So it is a good thing that
the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review-recognizing
that the practice of law is an established, here-to-stay, non-trivial in-
gredient of the profession-decided to dedicate an issue of the Law
Review to the memory of a practitioner, Henry W. Sawyer, III. Henry
was a singularly gifted advocate who achieved greatly in litigation of
great consequence. He ennobled our profession. He deserves to be
remembered in the pages of this venerablejournal-the Law Review of
which he was Managing Editor more than half a century ago.
The dominant dynamic elements, professional and personal, of
this remarkable lawyer have been faithfully captured in the three trib-
utes accompanying this one. Stewart Dalzell, in defining Henry Saw-
yer's decisive impact on trial and appellate courtrooms, has, in a com-
pellingly felicitous phrase, termed Henry a "Voice of Liberty."
William Coleman, building on Whitehead's linkage of art and law, has
crafted a lifelike "[p]ortrait" of Henry-a portrait of an artist who re-
mained a young man almost to the end of his long life. And Arlin Ad-
ams has traced the unorthodox career of a lawyer willing to take on
the " [u ] npopular" cases.
A comprehensive survey of Henry's artistry as an advocate would
call for close scrutiny of the dozens and dozens of trials and appeals
Henry handled in four decades of mastery of the courtroom. But the
timetable of this tributary issue of the Law Review does not permit a
research enterprise of that dimension. Perforce, it is necessary and
t United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. For his de-
scription of the events that led to the filing of the suit that was to bear fruit as School
Distfict of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the writer is indebted to
his friend Bernard Wolfmnan-professor of law at Harvard since 1976, and Dean of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School from 1970-75. See infra note 4 (describing
Wolfman's professional history).
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proper to confine our focus to the Sawyer cases of greatest public con-
sequence: the three cases Henry took to the Supreme Court. Confin-
ing the focus in this fashion foreshortens-and to that extent dis-
torts-Sawyer's corpus juris, it leaves out of account chapters of the
Sawyer story that matter a lot, such as the summer of 1965 which
Henry spent in Mississippi together with scores of other lawyers (most
of them younger) who signed on to protect the voting rights of black
Americans. But the three Supreme Court cases were of greatest pub-
lic consequence. In each Henry prevailed-to the immediate benefit
of his clients and to the lasting benefit of his country.
The Dalzell essay centers on the first of the three cases-Deutch v.
United States In arguing Deutch, Henry wove into his detailed recital
of the events giving rise to the prosecution a single electrifying fact-a
fact of no readily demonstrable doctrinal authority but of overwhelm-
ing moral authority-which, as the Dalzell essay explains, appears to
have been the ingredient which moved five justices to overturn
Henry's client's conviction for contempt of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities. I will discuss Henry's two other Supreme
Court victories-School District of Abington Township v. Schempp2 and
Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 In doing so, I will try to avoid another distortion
endemic in reprises of leading Supreme Court cases-the tendency to
look only at the argument and opinions in the Supreme Court, ne-
glecting what transpired below. In both Schempp and Lemon it is clear
that a masterly litigator planted in the trial court the seeds of the fruit
that was to ripen on appeal.
ABINGTON SCHOOLDISTRICT V. SCHEMPP
The Schempp case had its inception in a letter written in 1957 to
the Philadelphia chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. The
letter writer, Ellory Schempp, was a high school student, the oldest of
three Schempp children enrolled in the public schools of Abington
Township, a Philadelphia suburb. The letter described the discomfort
that Ellory, whose family was Unitarian, felt during the Bible reading
and recital of the Lord's Prayer that launched each school day. Ellory
wondered whether the ACLU-which, so he understood, cared about
issues of this sort-would regard this as a problem. Ellory had heard
good things about the ACLU's endeavors and he enclosed ten dollars
367 U.S. 456 (1961).
2 374 U.S. 203 (1963) [hereinafter Schempp].
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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to further those endeavors.
On receipt of the letter, Spencer Cox, the executive director of
the ACLU's Philadelphia chapter, consulted Bernard Wolfnan, an
ACLU member and young partner at Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen.4 Wolfrnan, who lived not far from Abington, agreed to call
upon the Schempps and explore the matter. An interview with Ellory
and his younger siblings, Donna and Roger-all three seriously trou-
bled by the obligatory prayer exercises-and then with their parents,
satisfied Wolfman that the Schempp family was prepared for the diffi-
culties that litigation might entail, if the board of the ACLU chapter
were to conclude that the chapter should take on the matter. Some
initial research persuaded Wolfman that the morning exercises that
disturbed the Schempps-the Bible reading portion of which was re-
quired by a Pennsylvania statute-posed substantial and unsettled
constitutional questions.
Wolfman then reported his findings to the board of the ACLU
chapter. All members of the Board were persuaded that the
Schempps' religious freedom issues were proper ACLU issues. Several
members, however, felt that taking on a litigation burden of such ex-
pectable magnitude was not a prudent allocation of limited resources,
given their commitment to assisting those still being tarred by McCar-
thyism and its dismal legacy. After extended discussion, the Board
voted-only to find itself equally divided. The deciding vote was that
of the Chair, Clark Byse, a Penn law professor s Byse noted that, as a
Catholic, he derived great comfort from the Bible; but, since all of his
fellow board members saw in the Schempp children's predicament
constitutional issues of gravity, he would vote with those who felt the
chapter should agree to take the matter on.
The Board's decision to provide counsel for the Schempps, how-
ever, did not mean that Wolfman would be that counsel. Wolfman
decided that for him, as a Jew, to represent the Schempps in a chal-
lenge to Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer merely
would add unnecessary and probably detrimental baggage to what
clearly would be a controversial and, in many quarters, an unpopular
cause. Wolfman so advised Spencer Cox and recommended that his
4 Wolfnan was a year behind Sawyer at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
and they served together as editors of the Law Review. In 1963, Wolfman left private
practice to return to Penn Law School as a member of the law faculty, and he served as
Dean from 1970-75. In 1976, Wolfianjoined the Harvard Law School faculty as Fes-
senden Professor of Law.
Byse left Penn for Harvard in 1958, where he is Byrne Professor Emeritus.
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friend Henry Sawyer-an ACLU member and young partner at
Drinker Biddle & Reath whom Wolfman had known since they were
fellow law students at Penn-be asked to assume the representation.
Cox acquiesced, so Wolfman presented the proposal to Henry Sawyer,
and Henry agreed to represent the Schempps.
In the District Court
In February 1958, Henry filed the Schempp complaint in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The defendants were the Abington School District, its Superinten-
dent, and other school officials. The object of the suit was to obtain a
decree enjoining the enforcement of section 1516 of the Public
School Act and to declare it unconstitutional. Section 1516 was a di-
rective that "[a] t least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, or
caused to be read, without comment, at the opening of each public
school on each school day, by the teacher in charge."7 Although not
required by the statute, the prescribed Bible reading was, in the
Abington schools, routinely followed by a recitation in unison of the
Lord's Prayer, which in turn usually was followed by the Pledge of Al-
legiance. Henry's theory of the case was that the prescribed Bible
reading, whether or not followed by the Lord's Prayer, constituted
both an establishment of religion and an infringement of the free ex-
ercise of religion in contravention of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the provisions of the federal Judicial Code (Tide 28) then
in force, a constitutional challenge to a state statute was required to be
heard by a three-judge district court, at least one of whose members
was a circuitjudge. The Schempp district court consisted of Chief Cir-
cuitJudge Biggs and DistrictJudges Kirkpatrick and Kraft. When the
matter came on for trial, the district court heard testimony from the
Schempps regarding the incompatibility of certain aspects of Biblical
doctrine, especially portions of the KingJames Version, with the relig-
ious beliefs of the Schempp family. Further, both sides presented ex-
pert witnesses.
The expert witness presented by Henry Sawyer was Dr. Solomon
6 Public School Act, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15-1516 (West 1949).
7The statute further provided that any schoolteacher having responsibility for
reading or causing the reading of the Bible verses who "shall fail or omit to do
so... shall, upon charges preferred for such failure or omission, and proof of the
same, before the board of directors of the school district, be discharged." Id. See also
infra note 12.
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Grayzel, an ordained rabbi who was editor of the Jewish Publication
Society. In its opinion, the district court summarized Dr. Grayzel's
testimony at some length:
Dr. Solomon Grayzel testified that there were marked differences be-
tween the Jewish Holy Scriptures and the Christian Holy Bible, the most
obvious of which was the absence of the New Testament in the Jewish
Holy Scriptures. Dr. Grayzel testified that portions of the New Testa-
ment were offensive to Jewish tradition and that, from the standpoint of
Jewish faith, the concept of Jesus Christ as the Son of God was "practi-
cally blasphemous." He cited instances in the New Testament which, as-
sertedly, were not only sectarian in nature but tended to bring the Jews
into ridicule or scorn. Dr. Grayzel gave as his expert opinion that such
material from the New Testament could be explained to Jewish children
in such a way as to do no harm to them. But if portions of the New Tes-
tament were read without explanation, they could be, and in his specific
experience with children Dr. Grayzel observed, had been, psychologi-
cally harmful to the child and had caused a divisive force within the so-
cial media of the school.
Dr. Grayzel also testified that there was significant difference in atti-
tude with regard to the respective Books of the Jewish and Christian Re-
ligions in thatJudaism attaches no special significance to the reading of
the Bible per se and that the Jewish Holy Scriptures are source materials
to be studied. But Dr. Grayzel did state that many portions of the New,
as well as of the Old, Testament contained passages of great literary and
moral value.
8
The expert witness for the defense was Luther A. Weigle, an or-
dained Lutheran minister who was Dean Emeritus of the Yale Divinity
School and Chairman of the Committee for the Preparation of the
Revised Standard Version of the Bible. The district court also summa-
rized Dr. Weigle's testimony at some length:
Dr. Luther A. Weigle, an expert witness for the defense, testified in some
detail as to the reasons for and the methods employed in developing the
King James and the Revised Standard Versions of the Bible. On direct
examination, Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was non-sectarian. He
later [presumably on cross-examination by Henry Sawyer] stated that the
phrase "non-sectarian" meant to him non-sectarian within the Christian
faiths. Dr. Weigle stated that his definition of the Holy Bible would in-
clude the Jewish Holy Scriptures, but also stated that the "Holy Bible"
would not be complete without the New Testament. He stated that the
New Testament "conveyed the message of Christians." In his opinion,
reading of the Holy Scriptures to the exclusion of the New Testament
8 Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-02 (E.D.
Pa. 1959) [hereinafter Schempp IH.
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would be a sectarian practice. Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was of
great moral, historical and literary value. This is conceded by all the par-
ties and is also the view of the court.
In September 1959, the district court, speaking through Chief
Judge Biggs, issued its opinion. The decision relied on the Supreme
Court's 1948 holding in McCollum v. Board of Education, which invali-
dated the Champaign, Illinois "released time" program.'0 Under that
plan, public school children were released from classes each week to
attend religious education conducted on school premises during
school hours. The Schempp district court concluded that Pennsylva-
nia's obligatory Bible reading program constituted an establishment
of religion. The court further held that the program inhibited the
free exercise of religion not only of students but also of their parents."
Although decided by the three-judge district court in 1959, and
notwithstanding the defendants' prompt filing of a notice of appeal,
Schempp was not to be addressed by the Supreme Court on the merits
until 1963. In December 1959, three months after the district court
judgment, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended section 1516.
The most significant change was the insertion-after the opening sen-
tence requiring daily readings from the Bible-of the following provi-
sion: "Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attend-
ing such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or
guardian."'2 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district
9 Id. at 402.
10 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
1 Schempp III, 177 F. Supp. at 407 ("If the faith of a child is developed inconsis-
tently with the faith of the parent and contrary to the wishes of the parent, interfer-
ence with the familial right of the parent to inculcate in the child the religion the par-
ent desires, is clear beyond doubt."). The court also found that teachers were
unconstitutionally coerced, since failure to read, or arrange for the reading of, the ten
Bible verses put a teacher at risk of discharge under the 1949 Bible reading statute as
originally enacted. See id. at 406 ("The sanction imposed upon the school teachers is
discharge from their offices if they fail to observe the requirement of the statute.").
But see infra note 12 (describing the amendment to the 1949 Bible reading statute that
eliminated the threat of discharge for non-cooperating teachers).
12 In amending section 1516, the General Assembly also deleted the provision that
put a non-cooperating teacher at risk of discharge. See supra note 6. However, as the
district court was to note in the subsequent opinion reexamining the case in the light
of the 1959 amendments, a teacher "who refuses or fails to obey the mandate of the
amended statute may have his contract of employment terminated pursuant to 24 P.S.
§ 11-1122 (Supp. 1960)." Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp.
815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1962) [hereinafter Schempp Il]. Section 11-1122 provided that
"[t]he only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or hereafter entered
into with a professional employe [sic] shall be immorality, incompetency, intemper-
ance, cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement, advocation of or participat-
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court's judgment and remanded the case "for such further proceed-
ings as might be appropriate in light of [the amendments to the chal-
lenged statute] ."
On remand, after intermediate activity of no consequence, 4 the
district court held an additional trial. Edward Schempp-the chil-
dren's father-testified about his decision not to request that the two
Schempp children still in school be excused from attending Bible
reading pursuant to the amendment's opt-out provision: he was con-
cerned that his children would be "labeled as 'odd-balls.'"' 5 Further,
the district court learned that
The procedure followed in the Abington Senior High School, following
the amendment of Section 1516, did differ somewhat from that which
was in effect prior to the amendment. We describe it briefly. The chil-
dren attending the High School, Roger and Donna included, reported
to their "homerooms' at 8:15 A.M. And a few minutes thereafter the Bi-
ble reading began with each pupil seated "at attention." The Bible read-
ing consists of reading, without comment, over a loud speaker ten verses
of the KingJames Version of the Bible. Then the children stood and re-
peated, with the public address system leading them, the Lord's Prayer.
Next, still standing, the children gave the Flag Salute. They then sat
down. Announcements were made and when the announcements were
completed the students went to their classrooms for the first classes of
the day. 16
In February 1962, the district court, again speaking through Chief
Judge Biggs, issued an opinion supplementing and reaffirming the Es-
tablishment Clause aspect of its September 1959 opinion. Said Chief
Judge Biggs:
The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional
and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance.
ing in un-American or subversive doctrines, persistent and willful violation of the
school laws of this Commonwealth .... " I. at 817 n.1. When the Supreme Court ul-
timately considered Schempp, the Court's opinion pointed out that "[t]he statute as
amended imposes no penalty upon a teacher refusing to obey its mandate. However, it
remains to be seen whether one refusing could have his contract of employment ter-
minated for 'willful violation of the school laws.'" Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208 n. 2
(1963) (quoting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122 (West 1999)).
is Schenpp, 364 U.S. 298, 298 (1960).
14 See 195 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (allowing plaintiffs to amend their pleading
in light of the statutory amendment). To complete the procedural picture, see also
184 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1959), which preceded the Supreme Court's vacate-and-
remand order. There, the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to enter-
tain the defendant's motion for relief from the final decree in view of the fact that an
appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court. Id. at 383-84.
is Schempp I, 201 F. Supp. at 818.
16 1d. at 817-18.
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The devotional and religious nature of the morning exercises is made all
the more apparent by the fact that the Bible reading is followed immedi-
ately by a recital in unison by the pupils of the Lord's Prayer. The fact
that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused from at-
tendance at the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the
ceremony for the "new" Section 1516, as did the statute prior to its 1959
amendment, unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school
day in every school in the Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the
school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority
of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the
statute requires the reading of the "Holy Bible," a Christian document,
the practice, as we said in our first opinion, prefers the Christian relig-
ion. The record demonstrates that it was the intention of the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to introduce a religious
ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth .
On the basis of the foregoing findings, Chief Judge Biggs relied
on McCollum v. Board of Education,8 the Champaign, Illinois "released
time" case, as he had done in the 1959 district court decision. 9 In ad-
dition to reinvoking McCollum, ChiefJudge Biggs quoted the Supreme
Court's assurance that "[w]e follow the McCollum case," articulated in
Zorach v. Clauson, which upheld the constitutionality of New York
20City's off-the-school-premises "released time" program. Notably,
ChiefJudge Biggs made no effort to show how the Supreme Court's
approval of the New York City program in Zorach could be squared with
its disapproval of the Champaign program in McCollum-or, more to
the pointjust how, putting aside the rhetoric in Zorach, the holding in
Zorach could be squared with the district court's determination that
Pennsylvania's Bible-reading ceremony did not pass constitutional
21
muster.
Stating that "[t]he Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has seen fit to
breach the wall between church and state," ChiefJudge Biggs went on
to "hold the statute as amended unconstitutional on the ground that
it violate[d] the 'Establishment of Religion' clause of the First
Amendment made applicable to the Commonwealth.. . by the Four-
17 Id. at 819.
18 Id. (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)).
19 Schempp III, 177 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S.
203).
20 Schempp II, 201 F. Supp. at 815 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315
(1952)).
21 Distinguishing Zorach would not, in fact, have been a difficult matter. Zorach in-
volved religious exercises conducted by non-school authorities and not on school
premises. To say that Zorach was a manifestly different case does not signify that Zorach
was rightly decided.
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teenth Amendment.2 The ChiefJudge found it "unnecessary to pass
upon any other contention made by the plaintiffs in respect to the
unconstitutionality of the statute or the practices thereunder."2 In
short, the district court, on weighing the impact of the amendment
permitting parents to withdraw their children from the Bible-reading
ceremony, (1) reaffirmed its prior holding that the ceremony was re-
ligious and hence constituted a forbidden establishment of religion,
and (2) sub silentio withdrew from, but did not repudiate, its prior
holding that the ceremony worked a forbidden restraint on the free
exercise of religion. This was the judgment that Henry Sawyer would
have to defend before the Supreme Court.
Between the District Court and the Supreme Court
In April 1962, two months after the three-judge district court is-
sued its final opinion'in Schempp, the Maryland Cqurt of Appeals de-
cided Murray v. Curlett.24 The plaintiffs in Murray were William
Murray, a student in the Baltimore public schools, and his mother,
Madalyn. The Murrays were atheists and had gone to a Maryland state
court to seek a writ of mandamus directing the Baltimore Board of
School Commissioners to rescind, as unconstitutional, Article VI, sec-
tion 6 of the Board's Rules. That section provided that "[e]ach
school, either collectively or in classes, shall be opened by the reading,
without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of
the Lord's Prayer." The rule further provided that "[a]ny child shall
be excused from participating in the opening exercises or from at-
tending the opening exercises upon written request of his parent or
guardian."2
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. The court's decision analogized
the opening prayer exercise to permissible prayer ceremonies in the
state legislature, the Congress, and the state and federal courts. The
court also found persuasive the fact that "the appellant-student in this
case was not compelled to participate in or attend the program he
claims is offensive to him" 6 Next, the decision referenced Schempp
and noted that the Supreme Court:
22 SchemppI, 201 F. Supp. at 819.
23 Id.
24 179A.2d 698 (Md. Ct. App. 1962).
Id. at 699 (emphasis omitted).
2 Id. at 702.
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ordered per curiam that the judgment below be vacated and remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings, after it was learned
that the Pennsylvania law had been so amended as to provide for the ex-
cusing of those students who objected to participating in a school open-
ing ceremony quite similar 
to that in Baltimore City.
2 -
In the court's view, "the remand of [Schempp] at least indicated that
the use of coercion or the lack of it may be the controlling factor in
deciding whether or not a constitutional right has been denied."28
Speaking to the district's court's decision on remand, the Murray
court noted that:
[i]n reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful that the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has, upon the remand, re-
heard the case, and again held (in an opinion byJohn Biggs, Jr., Circuit
Judge...) that the Pennsylvania statute is not constitutional despite the
fact that objecting students could have been excused on the request of
their parents, but we do not find the decision on remand persuasive and
decline to follow it."
Three members of the court, speaking through Chief Judge
Brune, dissented, arguing that "[t]here seems to be no substantial
room for dispute that the reading of passages from the Bible and the
recital of the Lord's Prayer are Christian religious exer-
cises... favor[ing] one religion and [doing] so against other religions
and against non-believers in any religion."30 For this reason, the dis-
senters concluded that the prayer recitation "is directly contra to the
prohibition against any 'law respecting an establishment of religion,'
contained in the First Amendment, as that provision has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court."M' The provision allowing parents to
excuse their children from participating did not, in the view of the
dissenters, "save the rule from collision with the 'establishment of re-
ligion' clause of the First Amendment, even if it could save it from col-
lision with the 'free exercise of religion' clause. 32 This was the case
because the "coercive or compulsive power of the State is exercised at
least to the extent of requiring pupils to attend school and it requires
affirmative action to exempt them from participation in these relig-
ious exercises."33 Finally, the dissenters noted that their conclusion
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
0 Id. at 708.
Id.
32 Id. at 709.
3Id.
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was "in accord with the result reached by a special three-judge District
Court in Pennsylvania in [Schemnqp].""
In June 1962, on the last day of the 1961 Term, the Supreme
Court, in Engel v. Vitalk held invalid New York's so-called "Regents'
Prayer'--"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers,
and our Country"-promulgated by the Regents of the State of New
York for daily recitation, on a non-compulsory basis, in New York's
public schools.35 Speaking through Justice Black, the Court held that
"it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers
for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government."4 Justice Stewart dissented.
On October 8, 1962, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Murray37  The Court then set the case down for argument with
Schempp. The arguments in Schempp and Murray took place in late Feb-
ruary 1963, just over a year after Chief Judge Biggs filed the second
merits opinion in Schempp. The Court's decisions in the two cases
were announced in'a single opinion on June 17, 1963, the last day of
the 1962 Term; the Maryland Court of Appeals judgment was re-
versed, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania judgment was af-
firmed. Justice Clark wrote the opinion of the Court. Justices Douglas
and Goldberg (the latter joined by justice Harlan) filed brief concur-
ring opinions, and Justice Brennan filed a seventy-five page concur-
ring opinion. All of the concurringJustices joined the opinion of the
Court. Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter in Engel v. Vitale a year be-
fore, again dissented.Y
The care with which Henry Sawyer had built the record in the dis-
trict court was fully vindicated in the Supreme Court. The Court's
opinion-following the opening paragraph that stated the central
constitutional question and how it was to be resolved-proceeded to
set forth "The Facts in Each Case." In stating the facts in Schempp, the
Court set forth verbatim the district court's summary of the testimony
of Dr. Grayzel, Henry Sawyer's expert witness, and of Dr. Weigle, the
defense expert whose testimony Henry turned to his own use.39 Fur-
Sid.
370 U.S. 421,422 (1962).
6 Id. at 425.
37 371 U.S. 809 (1962).
38 Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (describing the testimony of Dr. Grayzel
and Dr. Weigle before the district court).
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ther, the Court also set forth verbatim the district court's findings with
respect to the "devotional and religious nature of the morning exer-
cises."40 The crucial weight of this factual infrastructure becomes clear
when one reads the Court's statement of the governing constitutional
principles and the application of those principles to the two cases be-
fore the Court. In particular, the Court pointed to eight cases directly
considering the Establishment Clause.4 ' Taken together, these cases
articulated the following test of legislative power respecting religious
belief:
[What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If ei-
ther is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu-
tion. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion ....
Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we
find that the States are requiring the selection and reading at the open-
ing of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are pre-
scribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by
law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the
supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those
schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school atten-
dance, was present in the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. The trial
court in [Schempp] has found that such an opening exercise is a religious
ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the
court's finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that
finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
There is no such specific finding as to the religious character of the
40 Schempp II, 177 F. Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See supra text accompanying
note 17 (setting forth the court's reasoning with respect to the Establishment Clause
violation inherent in the statute).
41 In addition to McCollur, Zorach, and Engel, the five other cases referred to by the
Court included: Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a state constitu-
tional provision requiring that public officials make "a declaration of belief in the exis-
tence of God"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (sustaining "Sunday clos-
ing" law); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (sustaining government
reimbursement of parents for the cost of transportation to parochial schools); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (town ordinance requiring license and pay-
ment of fee to engage in solicitation invalid as applied to door-to-door solicitation by
Jehovah's Witnesses); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a
statute forbidding public solicitation on behalf of a religious cause without a public
official's approval).
[Vol. 148: 25
HENRY W. SAWYER, D7
exercises in [Murray], and the State contends (as does the State in
[Schempp]) that the program is an effort to extend its benefits to all pub-
lic school children without regard to their religious belief. Included
within its secular purposes, it says, are the promotion of moral values,
the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetua-
tion of our institutions and the teaching of literature. The case came up
on demurrer, of course, to a petition which alleged that the uniform
practice under the rule had been to read from the KingJames version of
the Bible and that the exercise was sectarian. The short answer, there-
fore, is that the religious character of the exercise was admitted by the
State.42
The dual Establishment Clause principles announced by the Su-
preme Court in Schempp--"[T]o withstand the strictures of the Estab-
lishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion"--were to be
the doctrinal building blocks of the triad of Establishment Clause
principles announced in Lemon v. Kurtzmann, Henry Sawyer's second
religion case.43
LEMON V. KURTZMAN
Lemon v. Kurtzman, Henry Sawyer's second campaign to enforce
the First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom, had as its tar-
get Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act-a statute enacted by the Pennsylvania general Assembly in 1968
with a view to alleviating the rapidly escalating financial burdens of
Pennsylvania's nonpublic schools.44 The statute authorized Pennsyl-
vania's Superintendent of Public Instruction to make a "contract" with
a nonpublic school under which the school would agree to teach one
or more "secular" subjects-mathematics, modem foreign languages,
physical science and physical education. The state would reimburse
the school for the costs of instruction, most particularly teacher's sala-
ries, books, and instructional equipment. The books and equipment
utilized in such a course were to be approved by the Superintendent
of Public Instruction, and state reimbursement could not be author-
ized for "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the mor-
als or forms of worship of any sect."4
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-24.
For the author's views of Schempp and Engel at the time of the Schempp decision,
see Louis H. Pollak, Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62
(1963).
"Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
4S Id. at 39-40.
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When the statute went into effect Pennsylvania spent approxi-
mately $5,000,000 annually to reimburse nonpublic schools pursuant
to these "contracts." The eleven hundred beneficiary schools had
educational responsibility for upwards of 500,000 pupils-twenty per-
cent of Pennsylvania's school population. More than ninety-six per-
cent of these pupils were enrolled in church-related schools. Those
who challenged the statute saw it as a device for funneling public
money to nonpublic-and, particularly, church-related-schools by
paying them for doing what they had traditionally done without de-
pending on public largesse.
In the District Court
As he had done in Schempp, Henry Sawyer brought his suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The suit-filed
in 1969-sought to enjoin further expenditures of state funds for this
allegedly unconstitutional enterprise.5 Once again, a threejudge dis-
trict court was convened. The panel consisted of District Judges Lu-
ongo and Troutman and Chief CircuitJudge Hastie.
The defendants moved to dismiss. On November 28, 1969, the
district court filed an opinion granting the motion.47 Judge Troutman
wrote for the court, stating that the doctrinal principles governing the
case were those announced by the Supreme Court in Schempp-i.e.,
that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there
must be "a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."48 Judge Troutman noted that "[tihe
plaintiffs allege as a fact that the purpose and primary effect of the
Education Act is to aid religion."49 However, Judge Troutman deter-
mined "that the allegation asserts not a fact but a conclusion of law
and as such is not admitted for the purposes of testing the sufficiency
of the complaint."5° He then held that "the purpose of the Education
Act can be found clearly on its face."51 Further, "[t]he Legislature has
See id. The plaintiffs included individuals suing as taxpayers and also the follow-
ing organizations: Americans United for Separation of Church and State; the Pennsyl-
vania Council of Churches; the PennsylvaniaJewish Community Relations Conference;
the Pennsylvania Conference of the NAACP; and the ACLU. The district court deter-
mined that the organizations did not have standing. Id. at 41.
47 Id. at 49.
Id. at 44 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
49 Id. at 43.
s Id.
s1 Id. at 45.
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declared that the purpose of the Education Act is 'to promote the wel-
fare of the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania' and 'to
promote the secular education of children of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania attending nonpublic schools.'"
2
Chief Judge Hastie dissented, stating that
the majority seems to view the question of the purpose and effect of the
statute as foreclosed by declarations in the statute itself that the legisla-
tive purpose is "to promote the welfare of the people of the Common-
wealth" and "to promote the secular education of children of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania attending nonpublic schools." With this I53
cannot agree.
Then-after pointing out that the issue before the court was not
"summary judgment where the factual posture of the case is estab-
lished by affidavits and exhibits" but a motion to dismiss with respect
to which "decision is controlled by the allegations of the complaint
and ourjudgment as to the potentiality of proof thereunder"5 -- Chief
Judge Hastie continued:
But even if inquiry as to purpose and effect should be confined to ex-
amination of the language and scheme of the statute, I cannot avoid the
conclusion that the primary purpose and effect of the enactment is to
help the nonpublic schools by supplying them with needed financial aid,
while whatever promotion of the public welfare is anticipated as a result
of such public assistance is at best an incidental consequence claimed in
justification of the state's action.
5 5
In the balance of his opinion, Chief Judge Hastie addressed the
larger implications of the case:
It has already been pointed out that sectarian schools are only part of
a complex of activities, many of them as 'secular' as the teaching of lan-
guages and physical science, which modem churches and religious insti-
tutions finance and conduct. Charities, hospitals, community centers
and homes for the aged and infirm are familiar examples.... If the
constitutional bar to state grants in all such cases should be removed, it
is reasonable to anticipate continuing political controversy in every state
and local community whether and to what extent public funds are to be
granted to subsidize a large number and a broad range of activities of re-
ligious organizations ....
So far we have escaped much of the divisiveness and antagonism of
52 Id.
53 Id. at 49-50.
54 Id. at 50 n.l.
W I&at5O.
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political differences and controversies about religious matters because
public financing of activities of religious organizations has been under-
stood to be prohibited by our Constitution. Professor Paul Freund has
perceptively pointed out that President Kennedy was able to avoid taking
a political position upon issues of religious character by relying upon
authoritative decisions on the constitutional separation of state and re-
ligion as controlling. [Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)]. But if the present statute is held to be
constitutional, I see no escape from the evils that attend a widespread
and pervasive intermingling of politics and religion.56
Henry Sawyer filed a notice of appeal, and on April 20, 1970, the Su-
preme Court noted probablejurisdiction.5
On June 15, 1970, a three-judge district court in Rhode Island
held invalid the Salary Supplement Act enacted by the Rhode Island
Legislature in 1969.58 Under that statute Rhode Island undertook to
pay to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools
salary supplements of up to fifteen percent of a teacher's salary. The
statute's stated purpose was "to assist non-public schools to provide
salary scales which will enable them to retain and obtain teaching per-
sonnel who meet recognized standards of quality."9 The court con-
ducted a trial, finding that the "evidence... fully corroborates the
legislature's finding of a financial crisis in non-public education, but
indicates that the crisis is largely confined to Rhode Island's Catholic
schools" in which "[alpproximately 95 per cent of the elementary
school children attending non-public schools are enrolled...."60
The financial problems besetting the elementary parochial
schools were found to have originated in the need to recruit hundreds
of lay teachers to supplement the nuns who historically had consti-
tuted more than ninety percent of the instructional staff. The efforts
of the parochial schools to recruit lay teachers, however, were made
more difficult by virtue of the steadily rising salaries of public school
teachers. The court determined that "[t]he Salary Supplement Act
will not relieve the parishes or parents of their escalating burden, but
will temporarily enable parochial schools to compete for qualified
teachers."61 The court found that "[o]n the one hand, it aids the qual-
5 Id. at51.
.5 397 U.S. 1034 (1970).
53 DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
59 Id. at 114
60 Id. at 115.
61 Id.
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ity of secular education; on the other, it provides support to a relig-
ious enterprise."62 In sum, the court saw "as the necessary effects of
the kind of legislation involved here not only substantial support for a
religious enterprise, but also the kind of reciprocal embroilments of
government and religion which the First Amendment was meant to
avoid." o The opinion of the court was written by CircuitJudge Coffin
and was joined by then-District Judge Bownes. Judge Pettine filed a
separate concurring opinion. On November 9, 1970, the Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction in the Rhode Island case, which
was then set down for argument with Lemon v. Kurtzman.
In the Supreme Court
Argument took place on March 3, 1971, and the Court issued its
decision on June 28, 1971-the last day of the 1970 Term.6 The
Court reversed the judgment of the Pennsylvania three-judge district
court and affirmed the judgment of the Rhode Island three-judge dis-
trict court. As was true in Schempp and Murray, the disposition of the
trial court that had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cog-
nizable cause of action was overturned, while the disposition of the
trial court that had conducted a trial was sustained.
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court,6 and built
upon the groundwork laid in Schempp.
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumula-
tive criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular leg-
62 Id. at 119.
6 Id. at 122.
6Earley v. Dicenso, 400 U.S. 901 (1970).
65 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
Joining the opinion in its entirety were Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart and
Blackmun. Justice Marshall joined the Rhode Island portion of the Chief Justice's
opinion, but took no part in Lemon; Justice Marshall also filed a brief separate state-
ment. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion in whichJustice Blackjoined, and in
which Justice Marshall substantially joined (except insofar as the opinion addressed
Lemon. Justice Brennan filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice White filed an
opinion concurring in Lemon and dissenting in the Rhode Island case. I& at 604.
It seems a reasonable surmise thatJustice Marshall recused himself in Lemon for
the reason that the Pennsylvania Conference of the NAACP was one of the initial
plaintiffs (albeit dismissed for lack of standing, along with the other organizational
plaintiffs, by the district court). It is understood to have beenJustice Marshall's settled
practice not to participate in cases in which the NAACP was a party, in view of theJus-
tice's long and triumphant association with the NAACP (and its affiliate, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational fund) in his lawyering days.
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islative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968) [quoting Schempp]; finally, the statute must not fos-
ter "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
6
7
Because the Rhode Island case had gone to trial, and hence had
generated a significant factual record, the opinion of the ChiefJustice
had considerably more to say about Rhode Island's salary supplement
program than about Pennsylvania's reimbursement program. The
ChiefJustice's discussion of the Pennsylvania program follows:
The Pennsylvania statute... provides state aid to church-related schools
for teachers' salaries. The complaint describes an educational system
that is very similar to the one existing in Rhode Island. According to the
allegations, the church-related elementary and secondary schools are
controlled by religious organizations, have the purpose of propagating
and promoting a particular religion's faith, and conduct their operations
to fulfill that purpose. Since this complaint was dismissed for failure to
state a claim for relief, we must accept these allegations as true for pur-
poses of our review.
As we noted earlier, the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to
ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to entan-
glements between church and state. The Pennsylvania statute, like that
of Rhode Island, fosters this kind of relationship. Reimbursement is not
only limited to courses offered in the public schools and materials ap-
proved by state officials, but the statute excludes "any subject matter ex-
pressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any
sect." In addition, schools seeking reimbursement must maintain ac-
counting procedures that require the State to establish the cost of the
secular as distinguished from the religious instruction.
The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of provid-
ing state financial aid directly to the church-related school. This factor
distinguishes both Everson and Allen, for in both those cases the Court
was careful to point out that state aid was provided to the student and his
parents-not to the church-related school. Board of Education v. Allen,
supra at 243-244; Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 18. In Walz v. Tax
Commission, supra at 675, the Court warned of the dangers of direct pay-
ments to religious organizations:
Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs,
could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relation-
ships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards.
67 Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
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The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indi-
cates that such programs have almost always been accompanied by vary-
ing measures of control and surveillance. The government cash grants
before us now provide no basis for predicting that comprehensive meas-
ures of surveillance and controls will not follow. In particular the gov-
ernment's post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related
school's financial records and to determine which expenditures are re-
ligious and which are secular creates an intimate and continuing rela-
tionship between church and state. 68
It is clear that, although the Pennsylvania district court did not
conduct a trial, the ChiefJustice gave careful attention to the limited
proceedings that did take place. Thus, the Chief Justice specifically
adverted to the fact that Chief Judge Hastie had dissented.69 Moreo-
ver, in emphasizing the entanglement risks "presented by the divisive
political potential of these state programs,"70 the Chief Justice cited
(albeit without attribution to Chief Judge Hastie) the same page of
the same article by Professor Freund that the Chief Judge had in-
voked. The ChiefJustice put the matter succinctly.
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even parti-
san, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to pro-
71
tect.
Lemon v. Kurtzman has been the law of the land for almost thirty
years. The attacks on its three-fold "test" have been numerous. But
the constitutional concerns animating the decision are no less valid
today than when ChiefJustice Burger (and Chief Judge Hastie) gave
voice to them.
CONCLUSION
In 1988, having heard that Henry Sawyer was in the process of
withdrawing from full-time active practice, a lawyer who had occasion
over the years to observe Henry as an appellate advocate wrote him a
letter. The letter-writing lawyer was WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., the Senior
Associate Justice, who had been a member of the Court since 1956--
five years before Henry argued Deutch. The letter said: "Since I've
68 Id. at 620-22.
69 Id. at 611.
70 Id. at 622.
71 Id.
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been here, few lawyers have equaled your advocacy."7 Praise from Sir
Hubert is praise indeed.
Letter from WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr. to Henry Sawyer, III.
